September 8, 1994
Professor Susan P. Sturm
University of Pennsylvania Law School
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
Dear Susan:
Reading your commentary on my article reminded me of a line
of dialogue from Cool HandLuke, a 1967 movie where Paul Newman
played a prisoner in a Southern chain gang; as I recall the line, in
the midst of one punishment after another inflicted on him by
various guards and fellow-prisoners, Newman exclaims, "What we
have here is a failure of communication." You and I too, I think,
have a failure of communication.
For most of your commentary, I don't recognize the article that
I had written. You repeatedly say, in particular, that I claim
scientists "can empirically demonstrate our fundamental commonality"' and that this demonstration is "not about values [but] about
truth,"2 whereas you maintain to the contrary that this is "a moral
and political judgment, not an empirical one."' But there is no
disagreement between us on this issue. I make this same observation several times in my article: for instance, I say,
The proper question for the behavioral scientists was not whether
these differences [between mentally disabled and other people]
existed, but whether they should be underscored....
From a strictly scientific perspective, there was no clearly
correct answer to this question.... [C]ommonalities are not
necessarily more fundamental... [but] neither is the existence of
4
the differences the scientifically more fundamental characteristic.
Again, in my conclusion, I say, "The choice in these matters ... is
not between truth and falsehood in behavioral science ....
Scientists can justify accentuating the differences among people as
well as emphasizing human commonalities."5
' Susan P. Sturm, Sameness and Subordination: The Dangers of a Universal Solution,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 201, 203 (1994).
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It may be that you were misled by my statement early in the
article, when I was describing Judge Bazelon's and the Brown
Justices' conjunctive use of moral beliefs and behavioral science,
that the scientific descriptive claim that "all human beings are
fundamentally alike" was "a logically correct proposition."' I can
see how the word "correct" here might mislead you. I did not mean
to say, however, that this was an empirically "true" position; I meant
that it was a logically coherent position-not that it was right but that
it was not demonstrably wrong, not illogical, to take this position.
I do think that the Law Review editors should change this one word
of mine from "logically correct" to "logically coherent" in order to
forestall any misunderstanding of my position. But if this change
is made, doesn't that remove any basis that you might have had for
reading my article as you did? Shouldn't you then revise your
account correspondingly?
You also misconstrue my views about the desirability of openly
avowed conflict in social relations. You claim that I believe we
should "avoid open acknowledgment and confrontation of...
differences" and that "conflict is bad, irreconcilable, and to be
avoided [because if] we acknowledge difference, conflict will
inevitably lead to a Hobbesian resolution."' You draw this characterization not so much from what I say explicitly in the article as
from your reading of the underlying implications of what I say.
Perhaps there is some basis in my article, of which I was unaware,
that supports this reading; but I do know that in other recent
writings, I have espoused exactly the opposite view from the
position you ascribe to me here. (See, in particular, my book The
Constitution in Conflict whose overarching theme is to criticize the
Supreme Court for suppressing open conflict among polarized or
potentially polarized adversaries).'
But though I do not believe-as you characterized my views-that
all "conflict is bad, irreconcilable, and to be avoided," I do believe
that all irreconcilable conflict is bad: bad for the combatants, bad
for the society in which these combatants live, bad for the possibility
of assuring a regime of mutual respect for the equal moral status of
these irreconcilably hostile adversaries. In this article, as well as in
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my recent book, I maintain that the proper goal for all governance
institutions, and for the judiciary in particular, is not to suppress
conflict but to encourage and guide the combatants to see one
another as potentially reconcilable. In other words, governance
institutions should work generally to promote mutual recognition
among adversaries of the commonalities that might unite them,
notwithstanding the hostility that is dividing them.
I agree with you that the insistence by one side (or by a
supposedly neutral third-partyjudge) on the existence of commonalities can easily reflect nothing more than continued subordination
of one side by the other. This was the unacknowledged meaning of
the "lily-white" version of the assimilationism that, as you point out,
both of us criticize. But once again you misconstrue my position
when you say that, although I "recognize the 'internal contradiction'" in this version of assimilationism, I "embrace the sameness
solution nonetheless."9 To the contrary, this form of "sameness"-that blacks and whites are really the same only if blacks would
act like, and think of themselves as, whites-is a mockery of the
pursuit of true commonality based on mutual respect, of the
democratic ideal of equality.
The fact that this kind of deception frequently arises as an
obstacle toward the pursuit of the mutuality ideal does not support
the conclusion that the ideal itself is flawed; this recurrent difficulty
leads me to conclude that the impulse to subordination is a
stubborn element in social relations, and is not easily tamed by
eliminating the most obvious forms of oppression-what you call
"first-generation forms of exclusion.""0 As an abstract principle,
I would say that the ideal progression in the elimination of
oppressive exclusion of pariah groups should come in two stages:
first an acknowledgment by the oppressors that they are fundamentally not superior to, and in this sense no different from, their
victims; and then appreciation of and respect for non-hierarchically
conceived differences. As I understand your position, I believe you
would agree with this statement; this, I think, is what you mean in
differentiating first- and second-generation forms of oppression.
But I believe that the first-generation forms are exceedingly difficult
to dislodge in relations between oppressors and oppressed and that
unless and until these forms are expunged-unless and until the
9 Sturm, supra note 7, at 7 n.14.
10Sturm, supra note 1, at 207.
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oppressors fully admit to themselves and acknowledge to their
previous victims that neither group is inherently superior, that their
moral status as human beings is identical and undifferentiated-this
second step of mutual respect for acknowledged differences cannot
be reliably achieved.
It is a complex business to translate this abstract formulation
into practical, concrete strategies for transforming oppressive social
relations. This formulation does not lead me, for example, to the
glib conclusion that some people have reached about the inherent
wrongfulness of race- or gender-based affirmative action. Eliminating affirmative action has the surface appeal of proclaiming
everyone's fundamental sameness; but so long as our social
arrangements patently belie this abstract proclamation-so long as
most African-Americans or women remain in positions of visibly
subordinated economic and social statuses-the "first-generation"
oppressions have not been reliably undone but have only been
disguised and reiterated. But nonetheless-and here is the complexity, as I see it-the race- or gender-based differences expressed by
affirmative action programs must be clearly and insistently understood only to be instrumental goals toward thoroughgoing mutual
acknowledgment of undifferentiated moral status, rather than
recognition of inherent, intrinsically valued differences as such.
In this sense I am espousing a hierarchy of values, with mutually
acknowledged commonality ranking above mutually acknowledged
respect for differences-not as a matter of empirical truth but as a
moral proposition. You were quite correct to insist that this
universalist position can readily become an instrument of oppression-an empirically observable truth that I failed to acknowledge in
my article. Perhaps my failure arose from a generational difference
between us-from the fact that my attention was focused on the
assumptions of the 1950s, when the politically powerful reformers
were themselves inclined to this same failure. Perhaps it also arose
from our differences in gender or other aspects of our personal
histories that might lead you to be more alert than I to the
deceptions and self-deceptions in protestations of common interests
from "superiors" toward their long-suffering subordinates. But I
would hope that your justifiable suspicions do not lead you to
abandon or subordinate the ideal of mutually acknowledged
commonality, only because of the ease with which this ideal can be
distorted in practice. I hope you would see how insistence on the
intrinsic value of human differences can itself easily, too easily,
escalate into mutual incomprehension and irreconcilable conflict
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that feed the stubborn impulse toward social relations based on
subordination and oppression.
I mentioned earlier in this letter the possibility that one
sentence in my original article might be changed in order to
eliminate what seemed to me a source of misunderstanding between
us. Perhaps, however, it would be more useful for our readers if we
were to leave the original sentence as it was, and publish this letter
instead as an appendix to your commentary-as a small demonstration of the way that although differences can become magnified,
corrective understandings do come in a relationship based on
mutual respect. What do you think?
Bo

